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Analysis of Cost at FAA’s En Route Centers:
An Empirical Perspective1
by Dipasis Bhadra, David Chin, Anthony Dziepak, and Kate Harback
In	this	paper,	an	empirical	framework	is	developed	using	economic	theories	to	examine	the	relation-
ships	between	variable	costs	and	levels	of	activities	at	the	Federal	Aviation	Administration’s	(FAA)	
en	route	centers.	Using	data	for	three	fiscal	years	and	employing	time-series	pooled	cross	section	
econometrics,	we	have	found	that	the	Air	Traffic	Organization’s	(ATO)	service	provisions	in	the	en	
route	centers	have	some	economies	of	scale.	Furthermore,	we	have	found	that	while	controllers’	
wage	is	important,	it	is	not	statistically	significant	in	unit	cost	measured	in	aircraft	flight	operation	
counts.	However,	it	is	statistically	significant	when	unit	variable	cost	is	measured	and	estimated	in	
terms	of	aircraft	flight	operation	hours.	We	have	also	found	that	degree	of	complexity,	a	measure	of	
service	attributes,	does	not	impact	cost.	These	findings,	combined	with	on-going	policy	discussion	
on	users’	fees,	imply	that	ATO	may	be	well	positioned	to	implement	average	cost	pricing	if	cost	is	to	
be	fully	recovered	for	en	route	services.	The	implementation	of	marginal	cost	pricing	may	require	
external	funding,	perhaps	from	general	funds	of	the	U.S.	Treasury.	
INTRODUCTION 
The organizational characteristics and performance of the air traffic/air navigation service providers 
(ATSP/ANSP) have been changing gradually over the last decade. Under this evolving organizational 
perspective, an empirical framework that measures productivity and cost efficiency may prove to 
be useful in the United States  and elsewhere. With that in mind, the following issues have been 
addressed in this paper: (a) to what extent, do the ATS provisions in the United States demonstrate 
characteristics of a natural monopoly? In other words, is there evidence of economies of scale and 
scope in ATS provisions in the United States? (b) Do the costs vary with respect to changes in traffic 
volume, complexity, weather—factors that tend to make the U.S. ATS provisions somewhat unique? 
(c) How do these costs compare with those in Europe? (d) Do the determinants of costs provide any 
guidance to collections of revenues from the system?  To address these issues, cost and traffic data 
on U.S. en route centers for the fiscal years (October − September) 2003 − 2005 have been used. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the background and reviews 
associated literature. The third section provides basic empirical characteristics of the U.S. en route 
centers and compares them with those of Europe. The purpose of this section is to identify major 
factors driving the cost elements. The fourth section provides a simple analytical framework of a 
natural monopoly and lays out the empirical model for which results are presented in section five. 
The final section provides policy conclusions and suggestions for future research. Following the 
references, an appendix, map and name identifications for the en route centers is provided. 
THE BACKGROUND 
During the last two years, a lively debate has ensued in the United States regarding the collection 
of revenue to fund the aviation system operated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
(FAA 2005). The Reauthorization Act with which Congress authorizes raising revenues via the 
ad valorem taxes and fees expired in September, 2007.2 Many stakeholders in the community, 
including the commercial airlines and the FAA, have argued that change is needed because there is 
no connection between the cost of services provided by the FAA (i.e., separation of aircraft, safety, 
and certification of air worthiness) and the revenue collected by the FAA, primarily via ticket taxes 
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and fees on individual passengers. The concerns about the existing revenue collection mechanisms 
and the pending Congressional reauthorization presented a rare and pressing opportunity to review 
financing alternatives. Under direction from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the FAA 
has evaluated alternative ways to raise revenues. The FAA/Bush Administration’s proposal3 included 
imposing user fees as a way of connecting revenue to costs and using price signals to allocate 
resources more efficiently and equitably. However, both the Senate bill4 and the Congressional 
bill5 took more conservative approaches. Many other government and semi-government agencies 
have also evaluated financing alternatives under direction from the congressional subcommittee on 
aviation (GAO 2007, 2006; CBO 2006; CRS 2006; DOT/OIG 2005).
The three major proposals (i.e., FAA/Administration’s; Senate Bill; and Congressional 
Bill) along with some other proposals (e.g., Air Transport Association 2006) are presently under 
consideration by the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Means 
Committee for final legislation.6 
Among the possible alternatives (see GAO 2006 for a detailed account), user fees based on 
cost recovery have surfaced as a potentially viable method without changing the current governance 
structure of the FAA. The members of the commercial scheduled air transportation community 
have argued7 that the present sharing of costs is not equitable because airlines use fewer resources 
in proportion to the revenues they raise. Under the present tax rates, an average effective tax rate of 
16.1% on fares and trips raises more than 90% of the total tax revenues originating in commercial 
schedule transportation activities (Yamanaka, Karlsson, and Odoni 2006). The allocation of these 
revenues is often challenged on numerous grounds. 
General aviation (GA), a vibrant aviation sector comprising those who routinely use the 
separation services under instrument flight rules (IFR) and those who primarily use visual flight 
rules (VFR), disagree.8 They argue that both the present cost sharing and the collection mechanism 
(i.e., fuel tax) are appropriate because GA’s use of the national airspace system (NAS) imposes only 
a marginal burden on the system.9 According to these users, the system was essentially created to 
serve commercial air services and any use by GA has been at the margin, and therefore, they should 
only pay marginal or incremental costs. Unfortunately, however, there has not been any effort to 
determine the magnitude of this marginal or incremental cost on the system.
Determining marginal cost for providers, such as air traffic services, that may enjoy economies 
of scale and scope is a challenging task. Incremental costs decline as services are scaled up (i.e., scale 
economies) that are often provided over multiple scopes (e.g., multiple users over spatially-spread 
locations). These scale dependencies and interdependencies over usages make clear estimation or 
assignment of marginal cost difficult. Economic theory (Shy 2001) has long stipulated that network 
industries (e.g., air traffic service (ATS) provisions) are natural monopolies, and as such, enjoy 
economies of scale and scope. Theories of public policies have argued (Alchian and Demstez 1972; 
Cornes and Sandler 1996) that in absence of any regulations, these natural monopolies fail to ensure 
pricing conducive to maximizing consumers’ (i.e., air travelers’) or social welfare. Thus, government 
regulations have been sought for ensuring marginal or average cost pricing as opposed to pricing 
under unregulated natural monopoly.10 Under these pricing schemes, commonly known as Ramsey 
pricing, consumers’ welfare is maximized while ensuring a constant rate of return for the natural 
monopolist, ATS providers, for example.
In practice, however, these regulations have spread far more extensively than pricing alone. 
Proponents of regulations have successfully ensured governments’ widespread regulatory and 
budgetary protections for air traffic service provisions (ATSP) in the U.S. and elsewhere. In recent 
times, however, many network industries globally (e.g., telecom, cable TV, power distribution) 
including ATSPs in countries outside the United States (S&P 2005; GAO 2005; Oster 2006) 
have begun experimenting with deregulation. The empirical evidence (Oster 2006) indicates that 
unbundling of products and services of ATSPs through regulatory reforms may, in fact, increase 
efficiencies (i.e., both operations and cost) by elimination of X-inefficiency (or managerial slacks). 
Rationalization of capital investments that leads to integration of revenue streams with that of 
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costs encourages innovation and ensures organizational independence. Separation of regulatory 
authority (e.g., safety, certification) from the operations is a key to this process. Because most of 
the reforms have taken place outside the United States (Cordle and Poole 2005), it is not clear to 
what extent the experiences from elsewhere apply to the United States. In particular, sheer traffic 
volume and airspace complexity together with routine weather incidences, have long been cited as 
characteristics differentiating the United States from others. Hence, efficiency gains that have been 
attained elsewhere through restructuring cost, revenue and operational characteristics may not be 
applicable to the United States (House Subcommittee Hearing on April 4, 2005). Empirical efforts 
comparing and contrasting the United States with other ATSPs have been attempted (Cordle and 
Poole 2005; MBS Ottawa 2006) to address some of these issues.  
Additionally, the aviation system users, commercial airlines in particular, have undergone a 
tremendous restructuring over the past five years following the events of 9/11 and continue to do 
so under the pressure of increasing jet fuel price (ATA 2006). The cost readjustment in the face of 
enhanced competition and changed marketplace has been extensive throughout the world. In their 
quest for further cost reduction, commercial and non-commercial aviation system users alike have 
repeatedly called for cost adjustments for the ATSPs.11  Following these calls and subsequent reforms, 
transparencies in management structure, costs and revenues reporting have ensued in many of the 
ATSPs, including those in the United States. Under the European Union’s mandatory agreement, for 
example, almost all members of the enlarged union (34, out of 35) now share ATSP cost data.12 The 
Performance Review Commission (PRC) of Eurocontrol uses these data to compare and contrast 
the performance of its members over time and issues annual ATM Cost Effectiveness (ACE) reports 
(PRU 2005). The PRU reports are available for four years covering 2001-2004.13
In the United States, the FAA has undergone extensive reforms in recent years as well. 
Public Law 106-181 (AIR-21) that was passed in April 2000 authorized the FAA to create a chief 
operating officer (COO) position responsible for overseeing day-to-day traffic control operations, 
undertaking initiatives to modernize air traffic control (ATC) systems, increasing productivity and 
implementing cost-saving measures, among other things. In December 2000, the President issued 
Executive Order 13180 authorizing the creation of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), headed by 
the COO (see GAO 2005). The new office leads NAS architecture, system engineering, investment 
analysis and operations research. The ATO was created in February 2004 by combining FAA’s 
Research and Acquisitions, Air Traffic Services, and Free Flight Offices into one performance-based 
organization (PBO).14 Under this new organization, cost information has become transparent, and, 
in fact, now plays a critical role in the trust fund debate.15 Furthermore, cost data played a key 
role in the discussion surrounding the contract negotiations between the FAA and the controllers 
that ended in June 2006. Furthermore, many of the recent organizational decisions, for example, 
restructuring FAA’s nine regional offices into three, and reducing management layers from 11 to six, 
were influenced by cost considerations. Over the last five years, the FAA invested large amounts of 
resources to streamline, document, improve, and present data on the system that are accepted under 
the general rules of accounting practices in the United States.16 Consequently, this information is 
gaining increasing credibility and may prove to be very important in comparing and contrasting 
performance of the U.S. ATO against those that provide similar services abroad. Just like in the 
PRC/Europe, this information can also be used to benchmark the U.S. ATO’s performance against 
others as well as itself over time. 
EMPIRICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. EN ROUTE CENTERS AND 
EMPIRICAL ISSUES
As shown in Table 1, the 20 contiguous U.S. en route centers (or, just centers for short) handled 
more than 43 million operations17 a year in 2005. Approximately 39.68 million IFR operations were 
handled by the 20 contiguous centers18 in fiscal year (FY) 2003. 
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Table 1: Basic Traffic Data for U.S. Centers During FY 2003-2005 (in millions)
2003 2004 2005
Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight 
Counts Hours Counts Hours Counts Hours
Commercial Carriers 30.25 17.26 32.52 17.78 33.71 18.44
IFR GA 7.48 5.28 8.01 5.43 7.96 5.36
Military 1.37 1.02 1.47 1.09 1.38 1.01
Other Traffic 0.58 0.39 0.56 0.35 0.52 0.32
Total 39.68 23.95 42.56 24.65 43.57 25.13
Source: Authors’ calculation from FAA data 
The commercial users that include commercial operations, commuters, air taxis and cargo had 
around 76-77% of the operations with a share of around 72-73% of the hours handled by the centers. 
IFR GAs had a share of around 18% of the flights with around 22% of the flight hours during the 
fiscal years 2003-2005 (Table 1). 
The growth rate of IFR flight operations during 2003-2004 was 7.2% which was three 
percentage points higher than the annual average growth rate prior to 2001 (i.e., 1998-2000). While 
the events around 9/11 reduced aviation demand in the U.S. NAS somewhat (i.e., -2.7% in 2001-
2000; and -0.9% in 2002-2001), U.S. aviation activities have rebounded considerably in 2003-2004 
and stabilized in 2005 with annual growth rate of approximately 2.4% (authors’ calculation based 
on ATO ETMS boundary crossing table). 
Figure 1: Distribution of Operation Counts in 2005 (millions)
Source: Authors’ calculation
The en route centers are positioned to meet the needs of these flight operations. It is obvious 
that the flight patterns and their distributions are influenced by the passenger traffic demand between 
origin and destination cities, routes through which these demands are met, types and compositions 
of aircraft, and the geographic shape of the centers. Together with the convective weather, the traffic 
flow patterns determine the levels of complexity at the centers. As Figure 1 indicates, each center has 
distinct patterns with respect to use. At the high end,19 for example, Washington (ZDC) and Atlanta 
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(ZTL) centers handled the most IFR operations, with Cleveland (ZOB) and New York (ZNY) right 
behind. At the low end of the scale, Seattle (ZSE), Salt Lake (ZLC), and Oakland (ZOA) centers 
handled the lowest IFR flights.20 
The number of flight operations is indeed an important metric to determine the levels of 
activities within the center. However, the workload at the centers is determined by the operation 
occurrence as well as the intensity of uses as measured by time (i.e., hours spent), complexity and 
sector characteristics (e.g., upper vs. lower sectors). Total flight operation hours under each center’s 
control is a derived demand, derived from the flight operation counts (see Bhadra, Hogan and 
Schaufele 2006 for this approach).21 Thus, total flight operation hours track very well, as expected, 
with the operation counts. Approximately, 25.13 million IFR operation hours were generated by 
43.57 million operation counts in the U.S. NAS in 2005 (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 
Given the close relationship between flight operation counts and flight operation hours, it is 
interesting to observe, however, while flight operation hours had a growth rate of around 3% during 
the period 2003-2004, operation counts experienced 7.2% growth. This is perhaps indicative of 
shorter flight lengths. During 2004-2005, operation hours grew (2%) closely with that of operations 
counts (2.5%). 
Figure 2: Distribution of Flight Operation Hours in 2005 (millions)
Source: Authors’ calculation
The en route centers can be thought of, from an input-output sense, as primarily employing 
controllers to produce flight operation hours. The mix of the flight operations22 and the time they 
spend are important in determining workload, the center’s performance, and cost. For example, 
almost three out of every four flights (72%) en route are commercial in nature (i.e., commercial 
operations, air taxi, and cargo) requiring different treatment than the one in five (22%) which are 
IFR GAs and around 4% military and other flights. Presently, the ATC facilities are organized and 
planned for around the aggregate workload hours.23 
The visual evidence that aircraft counts (Figure 1) and number of operation hours (Figure 2) 
track well indicates that output metrics (i.e., operation hours or operation counts) may correlate 
with the cost24 of providing these services. More demand for services, keeping all else constant or 
ceteris paribus, may also lead to higher costs and vice versa. Figure 3 shows that there may be some 
positive correlations between output and costs; locations with darker shades in Figure 2 are also 
associated with similar locations and shading in Figures 1 and 3. 
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Figure 3: En Route Center Variable Cost of Service in 2005 (U.S. millions $)
Source: Authors’ calculation
Notice, however, that this correspondence is not perfect. Beyond the obvious positive 
association between aircraft hours/flight operation counts and cost, spatial spread and determinants 
of these costs need to be explained as well. Finding these determinants is necessary to determine 
the incremental cost of providing the services while adequately controlling for all other factors that 
may be influencing cost. 
Table 2: Basic Data for European ANSPs
Key Data for the European ANS system 2003
ANSPs 34
Area Control Centres (ACCs) 68
En-route sectors at maximum configuration 599
Approach Units (APPs) 190
Towers (TWRs) 417
AFIS units 91
Flight-hours controlled (M) 11.2
IFR airport movements (M) 13.7
Total Air Navigation Services (ANS) staff 54,339
   Air	Traffic	Controller	in	Operation	(ATCOs	in	OPS) 15,672
Gate-to-gate ANS costs (€ M) 6,741
Gate-to-gate ANS revenues (€ M) 6,794
Gate-to-gate ATM/CNS capital employed (€ M) 7,299
Source: http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/ (2007) 
In comparison, European airspace consists of 34 ANSPs with 68 area control centers that are 
roughly equivalent to 20 contiguous U.S. en route centers in terms of geographical size. Notice that 
for traffic levels that were almost three and a half times less than the levels U.S. centers’ handled in 
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2003, costs of providing these services were largely similar (see Table 2). Compared to the United 
States, the effective tax rate is slightly lower in the European Union: 12.5% in the EU-15 compared 
to 16.1% in the United States (see Yamanaka, Karlsson and Odoni 2006).   
Much of the costs at the U.S. centers is labor cost. However, there is a considerable variation 
in the share labor costs represented in the total cost across the centers. For example, Minneapolis 
has the lowest, at about 56%, while Chicago had the highest at about 68%.  This distribution can be 
seen in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Percent of Labor in Total Cost in 2005
Source: Authors’ calculation
While labor accounted for 48% of the costs of the entire en route service, the centers for the 
contiguous United States make up only 76% of the total en route costs reported in the cost of 
services table in cost accounting system (or CAS) of the ATO. The remaining en route centers 
include Anchorage, San Juan, and Guam (not included in the map), all of which have labor costs that 
have a lower share of their total costs than is the case for the contiguous centers (32%, 41%, 44% 
respectively; authors’ analysis of CAS data).  These three centers, however, only represent about 4% 
of the overall en route costs, meaning that about 20% of the costs reflected in the overall air traffic 
service cost of services report are not explicitly traceable to en route centers in the CAS system.
Finally, the U.S. airspace is complex. It is likely, therefore, that centers bear higher costs 
depending upon the degrees of complexity. There are many measures of complexity, ranging from 
simple volume of traffic to intricate details on how the traffic interacts with other features of the 
airspace. In this analysis, we consider intersection density, a tool (Glover 2004) that takes into 
account both flight operation counts and interactions between traffic (see Figure 5).
The key point of Figure 5 is that the higher the complexities (darker shade), the higher the 
intersections of traffic (dots). These appear to be somewhat correlated with costs as well, an 
assumption that will be empirically tested below.  
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Figure 5: Airspace Complexity (June 1, 2005) 
A SIMPLE ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Economic theory states that a natural monopoly is characterized by declining unit costs over all 
ranges of output. This acts as a natural barrier against the entry of competitors, making the monopoly 
natural. Following rules of profit-maximization, an unregulated natural monopoly would produce 
Qm service and charge Pm price (see Figure 6). Under this equilibrium, SpPm is the surplus that 
consumers receive while the rectangle Pmpck represents unregulated monopolist’s profit. 
Clearly, there are economic opportunities that are not appropriated. The least cost combination 
of price and output would be P
r1
 and Q
r1
 where the natural monopolist is regulated to set its price equal 
to average total cost in order to take advantage of the declining unit cost. Under this average cost 
pricing, the monopolist’s erstwhile profit has been transferred to consumers’ surplus. Interestingly, 
a new triangle of benefit pR
1
j,called deadweight loss, has been added to consumers’ surplus. This 
conversion of deadweight loss under unregulated monopoly to something enhancing social welfare 
as consumers’ surplus is considered as the benefit of average cost pricing for natural monopoly. 
Under this pricing, a normal rate of return (or premium) can be guaranteed to the natural monopolist 
by adding it to the average total cost. 
Alternatively, if the regulated price were to be set equal to the marginal cost, i.e., P
r2
, the quantity 
would have increased to Q
r2
. However, the monopolist would incur a loss, per unit of output, that 
equals the vertical distance between the marginal and average cost, i.e., approximately (P
r1
 – P
r2
). 
For a regulated natural monopoly, therefore, marginal cost pricing leads to a loss that will have to be 
paid by the government’s general fund or subsidy in some form.
Two implications follow immediately from this demonstration: (a) if the industry is exhibiting 
economies of scale for the full range of output, the least cost structure is indeed provided by a 
monopoly; and (b) if the firm is to set price according to marginal cost, then, it cannot recover the full 
cost. Thus, full recovery of cost would require a subsidy or general funding of the amount between 
marginal and average total cost, i.e., roughly the difference between P
r1
 and P
r2
 (see Panzar and 
Willig 1977 for the original treatment of these results). However, the average cost pricing ensures 
both technical and allocative efficiencies.25 It is evident that prior to arguing for one form of pricing 
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or another, one needs to empirically establish that  the average total and marginal cost are indeed 
falling for all observable ranges of output. In the empirical section below, this task is addressed in 
a generalized fashion. 
Figure 6: A Simple Analytical Model of a Single Service Natural Monopoly ATS Provider 
Note that the above example is for a single service provider. In reality, however, any ATSP, 
or FAA’s ATO in particular, provides more than one service. Although service provisions can be 
classified into numerous categories (Bhadra, Hogan and Schaufele 2006), it is assumed in this paper 
given the task at hand, that the ATO serves only the following two users: commercial operations 
including air taxis and cargo. IFR GA, i.e., military and other users are excluded. Given the earlier 
discussion, we consider some of the other factors influencing the costs in a direct or indirect way: 
(1) 
where TC is the total cost; wl is the wage payment to labor; sq is the variable representing service 
attributes (i.e., complexity, weather, and traffic restrictions); and Q
i
, and Qj, represent commercial 
operations and IFR GA, respectively. Variations of (1) are empirically tested for the existence of 
natural monopoly in U.S. ATS provision26 followed by determining the marginal cost for different 
services. In the section below, the data and variables used for this empirical analysis are discussed.  
DATA
With the passing of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, the FAA was required to 
“develop a cost accounting system that adequately and accurately reflects the investments, operating 
and overhead costs, revenues, and other financial measurement and reporting aspects of its 
operations.”27 The 2000 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century 
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(AIR-21, 2000) required the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) to conduct annual assessments of the FAA’s CAS.
In February of 2001, the OIG (2001) reported that implementation of the CAS was four years 
behind schedule.  The OIG also found that FAA had a lot of room for improvement in the quality 
of tracking labor cost, overhead, and assets.  By January of 2002 in the report assessing the CAS 
for 2001, OIG (2002) was able to report that the FAA had made significant progress, though it still 
lagged behind schedule and faced many challenges. Subsequent reports assessing years 2002 and 
2003 (covering some events in 2004) completed in June of 2003 (OIG 2003) and November of 2004 
(OIG 2004) respectively, read similarly. They cite both accomplishments and shortfalls. The overall 
picture of the trend that emerges is one of gradual but consistent improvement, with significant 
obstacles still in place.  
One setback occurred at the beginning of fiscal year 2004 when the FAA began connecting 
the CAS to the new Delphi financial management system. These problems stopped the ongoing 
processing of cost data and created a backlog which left FY 2004 CAS data unavailable until 2005. 
During the time period over which the backlog was processed through the present, more sweeping 
improvements are reported to have been made to the system, though these have not yet been 
documented in an OIG assessment.  FAA regards the FY 2005 data as the cleanest and most thorough 
cost accounting data to date.  A move is being made to make the data available on a quarterly basis. 
With these cautions in place, CAS data for fiscal years 2003-2005 with the corresponding traffic data 
was combined for the same years. 
Accessing the most recent CAS data requires accessing the FAA’s Report Analysis and 
Distribution System (RADS).  The historic data is, however, available in the CAS reports archive28 
on the FAA’s public website. Presently, the CAS accounting reports archive contains annual cost 
of service data for fiscal years 1999 through 2003, classified by five lines of businesses (or, service 
delivery points, SDP): (1) Air traffic service; (2) En route SDPs; (3) Oceanic SDPs; (4) Flight 
services SDPs; and (5) Terminal services SDPs. 
Table 3: Data Characteristics by Fiscal Years
FY TYPE ATC W Sq Q
i
Scale: Q
i
Qj Scale: Qj Scope
2003 MEAN $44.88 $162,595 2859 1,512,568 2.5E+12 374,029 1.604E+11 6.18E+11
2003 STD $9.09 $11,262 1773 480,012 1.6E+12 146,823 1.13E+11 3.8E+11
2003 N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2004 MEAN $45.51 $171,313 3134 1,625,763 2.9E+12 400,354 1.832E+11 7.11E+11
2004 STD $9.82 $11,310 1822 529,397 1.8E+12 155,179 1.275E+11 4.38E+11
2004 N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2005 MEAN $45.45 $181,294 1830 1,685,414 3.1E+12 398,105 1.801E+11 7.33E+11
2005 STD $9.83 $12,262 1091 564,827 2.1E+12 150,864 1.265E+11 4.53E+11
2005 N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Source: Authors’ calculation
For information on traffic (i.e., output measures) handled by the centers, the Enhanced Traffic 
Management System (ETMS) data was used.29,30 The ETMS data contains records of flight operation 
counts operated under IFR that were processed by the host computer system and worked by FAA 
controllers. The ETMS flight operation counts and hours are based on the RADAR data thus 
eliminating some potential bias in the reporting procedures that may perhaps be present in air traffic 
activities data system (or, ATADS) data.  In addition, the finance division of the FAA’s Air Traffic 
Organization (ATO-F) uses ETMS flight operation hours as the measure of the output or services 
that the FAA provides to users of the system. Using the position data of a flight operation (i.e., 
departure, arrival, and route messages), ATO (AIM Lab) prepares a table of boundary crossing. 
The boundary crossing data contains one record for each piece of airspace that a flight traverses. As 
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opposed to the flight track (TZ) data which in general contains one record a minute, the boundary 
crossing table is summarized to contain the entry and exit positions and times for the pieces of 
airspace traversed.  The aggregate nature and the efficiency of the boundary crossing table makes 
it possible to align the data to the monthly statistics of flight operation counts and time in facility 
(flight operation hours) that are necessary for this study. The boundary crossing data was used to 
measure the aggregate output metrics annually. In the table below, the basic characteristics of the 
data that are used in this empirical analysis are provided. Variables represented in columns of Table 
3 are defined in the next section.  
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS
Following the underlying relationships between cost and production of services, also known as 
Shephard’s duality lemma (Varian 1999), equation (1) can be written in terms of unit cost function 
(ATC) for multi-service provisions as follows: 
(2)               
where ATC, or short-run average total cost, is defined as total variable cost divided by total flight 
operation counts (or hours) that each center serves; and w is the average wage paid to controllers. 
Notice that (2) is a pseudo dual cost function because it does not have the price of outputs or 
services. Lack of information about other resources and consideration of exogenous factors (e.g., 
service attributes measures) make the above cost function short run.    
Using the earlier discussion as a guide, equation (2) can be specified as follows:31  
(3)  
             
  
where sq is represented by total counts of interactions density for a busy representative day in 
different years (as measured by intersection density tools); scale is represented by the square of the 
total number of IFR flight operation counts (i.e., commercial and IFR GA flights) that the center 
handles and scope is defined by the multiplicative interactions between IFR GA and commercial 
flights. All other variables in (3) have been defined earlier.    
Before the empirical results are presented with supporting analysis, it is important to address 
issues involving the data and estimation procedure. The number of observations in the dataset is 
limited essentially by number of years (i.e., 20 centers over three years equaling 60). In situations 
like this, analysts often pool cross sections of data over time and use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. While this is routinely done, there are some obvious problems with this procedure. For 
example, variables in cross section units may be correlated over time; one activity (e.g., commercial 
operations) may be too closely correlated to another (e.g., IFR GA) across centers and over time. 
In addition, unobserved or omitted variables are often present (either in a systematic or random 
manner) that are lumped together under OLS procedure and treated as errors with assumption of 
normality. Due to pooling data together, good information is lost that, instead of increasing the 
efficiency of estimation, is treated as errors or nuisance. 
To understand the general structure of relationships among variables in a cross-section pooled 
time series dataset, a test for multicollinearity among all exogenous variables in the sample is 
conducted. When explanatory variables are correlated, the estimated coefficients could potentially be 
less precise. This is caused by the fact that the degrees of correlations among explanatory variables 
may, in fact, be larger than their corresponding association with the explained variable, in this case, 
ATC. Associations among explanatory variables always exist, the degrees of which differ depending 
on the data and variables. Interestingly, however, if those dependencies remain stable over time 
(three years in our case), estimated parameters are expected to yield relatively low standard errors in 
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terms of their units and thus can be used for i empirical relationships as well as to forecast (if there 
is a need) the underlying relationship. 
Nonetheless, a formal test of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables is performed. 
Examining these test results estimated over the entire sample (60 observations),32 the standard errors 
associated with the proposed explanatory variables are small and stable.33 The condition indices,34 
however, appear to be larger for two variables than what is usually suggested and those are scale 
economies for IFR GA, and scope economies (i.e., interactions between commercial and IFR GA). 
In a cross-section pooled time series dataset, these are expected outcomes. In fact, multicollinearity 
in time series data are common and typically arise because the information content of the sample 
is not generally rich enough to meet the information requirements specified by the model (Hsiao 
2003). Given this, it is evident that the use of OLS is not appropriate for the data and types of models 
being considered in this research. 
To overcome the limitations of OLS, we categorize data as panel data. Generally speaking, 
econometric procedures analyze a class of linear econometric models that are more applicable when 
time series (i.e., fiscal years) and cross sectional (i.e., centers) data are combined to form time series 
cross section (or, TSCS) or panel data. This procedure is particularly useful for situations where it is 
important to (a) identify models to discern knowledge regarding competing hypotheses (e.g., testing 
of natural monopoly); (b) minimize or eliminate estimation bias that often arises under standard 
OLS procedure; and (c) finally and most importantly, reduce  problems of multicollinearity (Hsiao 
2003). In addition, data attributes observed on a cross section of centers representing individuality 
of centers over time (i.e., intertemporal dynamics) allow us to have greater degrees of freedom thus 
reducing the gap between information of a model and those provided by the data (Hsiao 2003). Time 
stable characteristics of the units of analysis (i.e., centers) are better understood by applying TSCS 
procedure.   
The TSCS regression equation can be generally specified as follows: 
(4)
ATC = y
it
 is a function of a host of factors that are represented by X
itk
, where i = 1, …, N are the units 
of observations or number of cross sections (i.e., centers); t = 1, …., T are the length of time periods 
(i.e., fiscal years 2003-2005) for each cross section; and k = 1…, K are the number of explanatory 
or exogenous variables. 
The composite error term (uit) can be specified as follows:
 
(5) 
When the error depends only on cross sections (vi), the specification is called a one-way 
fixed effect model. Alternatively, this can be captured by unit or center-specific dummy variables. 
However, when the error depends on both cross sections (vi) and time (et), a two-way fixed effect 
model is more appropriate. Finally, ε
it
 is the classical error with zero mean and constant variance. 
Cross sections could be different among themselves (e.g., Seattle is different than New York) 
or they could be different over time (i.e., two-way fixed effect). Furthermore, these effects can be 
nonrandom (e.g., coastal en route centers may be systematically different than those that are located 
inland) or completely random. Finally, when errors (both across cross sections and over time) are 
correlated, serial autocorrelation is present. 
If cross sectional or over time effects are fixed (i.e., both one- and two-way fixed effect models), 
the regression models can be used with dummy variables (i.e., year and cross section units) by 
using OLS which is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). Given the earlier observations on 
limitations of OLS and the relatively small size of the sample, this severely limits the degrees 
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of freedom and limits the efficiency of OLS estimators. Alternatively, if the effects are not fixed 
(or assumed to be), then empirical specification requires that the effects are independent of the 
regressors (or, X
itk
). These classes of models are called random effect (RE) models. For RE models, 
the estimation method is feasible estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) procedure. This 
involves estimating the variance components first and then using the estimated variance-covariance 
matrix for applying the generalized least squares (GLS) model to the data. Given the assumption of 
RE and thus use of the variance component model, we use the Fuller-Battese method to estimate the 
regression parameters of the generalized model.35 The aggregate estimated features of the model are 
reported in Table 4A. 
Table 4A: TSCS Estimation Results for 20 Centers:
     Aggregate Features
                          
          
Dependent Variable: UnitAVC (Counts: Measured 
by Number of Flights)
Model Description 
Estimation Method     
Number of Cross Sections                
Time Series Length                          
Fuller
    20 
       3 
Fit Statistics 
SSE              69.2006  
MSE  1.3308  
R-Square       0.6567  
  DFE                  
Root MSE  
   52 
1.1536
Variance Component Estimates 
Variance Component for Cross Sections   
Variance Component for Time Series           
Variance Component for Error                     
  13.4864  
 1.350907  
   1.104113
Hausman Test for Random Effects
DF  m Value  Pr > m
7           19.04           0.0081  
There are 20 cross sections which are the centers over a period of three years that have been 
estimated by Battise-Fuller method in SAS 9.1 environment. Given 60 observations and eight 
explanatory variables in the specified model, there are 52 degrees of freedom (DFE). Low mean 
squared error (MSE) and root mean squared errors (RMSE) in the magnitude of $1.33 and $1.15, 
respectively, represent relatively close fit of the estimation to the data. The R2 signifies almost 2/3 of 
the variation in the data has been explained by the model specification.36 Despite the high variability 
in variance across cross sections, variance components for time series and errors are relatively 
small. Finally, Hausman m-test for random effects represents the appropriateness of the random-
effects specification as opposed to OLS specification. This test is based on the assumption that 
under no correlation, the null hypothesis between the effect variables (uit) and regressors (Xitk), OLS 
and GLS are consistent. However, OLS is inefficient. Hence, the Hausman test is performed to 
demonstrate that the GLS estimation is more applicable.37 The m-test shows that GLS estimation is 
indeed appropriate for the data under consideration.  
Analysis of Cost at FAA's En Route Centers
32
Table 4B illustrates TSCS estimation results for specified parameters. 
Table 4B: TSCS Estimation Results for 20 Centers: Parameters 
The TSCSREG Procedure
Fuller and Battese Method Estimation
Dependent Variable: UnitAVC (Counts: Measured by Number of Flights)
Parameter Estimates
Variable  DF Estimate
Standard
Error
t- 
value  Pr > |t|  Label
Intercept  
w  
sq  
Q  i
Scale: Q  i
Q  j
Scale: Q  j
Scope  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
78.08404  
0.000069  
-0.00001  
-0.00004  
3.94E-13  
-9.44E-06
-9.06E-11
4.82E-11  
9.9484  
0.000059
0.000359
0.00001  
3.11E-12
 0.000028
 6.39E-11
2.52E-11
7.85  
 1.17  
 -0.04  
-3.55  
 0.13  
 -0.34  
 -1.42  
 1.92  
<.0001
0.247  
0.971  
8E-04 
0.9  
0.738  
0.163  
0.061  
 Intercept
Average Annual Wage ($) of Center Controllers (PC&B) 
Complexity Measure by Interaction Density
Number of Commercial Flights
Scale Effect in Commercial Operations 
Number of IFR GA Flights
Scale Effect in IFR GA Operations
Scope Measure as captured by 
Interactions between Commercial and IFR GA Flights
Notice that the estimated intercept is statistically significant at a 99% level of significance. This 
signifies that centers are indeed different and those differences persist over time. In RE specification, 
a significant intercept captures those differences. 
Average wage of controllers appears to have the right sign but is not statistically significant. That 
is, higher average wage tends to increase the average unit total cost. While the estimated parameter 
has the right sign, statistical insignificance may be reflective of the fact that labor costs are part of 
fixed cost due to contractual arrangements and terms of long-term employment. Empirical evidence 
(Oster 2006) indicates that is the case in other countries as well. Interestingly, however, complexity 
reduces cost, as opposed to the expected increases in unit total variable cost controlling for output 
and other measures. However, it is insignificant and thus may be dropped in re-specification. This 
result does not particularly make sense. Either the data construction or the metric may need to be 
looked at further.   
The output or service measures, as represented by commercial, and IFR GA flight operation 
counts have been estimated to have negative coefficients. While they are statistically significant (99%) 
for commercial flight operation counts, they are insignificant for IFR GA flight operation counts. 
This is an interesting finding, for as services increase, unit variable cost declines for commercial 
operations confirming the earlier empirical hypothesis of natural monopoly of the centers for this 
group of users. However, this is not the case for IFR GA users. 
The underlying nature of the scale economies in providing specified services is not confirmed 
by the scale economies as measured by the total flight activities for respective services (i.e., scale: Q
i
 
and scale: Qj). Notice further that increased scope (i.e., mixing services of commercial and IFR GA 
flight operation counts within a center) may increase unit variable cost, a result that is statistically 
significant (90%) and may make intuitive sense. The nature of composite services provided by 
centers, given the types of aircraft flown by IFR GA and commercial operators, could be different 
leading to scope diseconomies and increasing unit variable cost.  
Given the findings of Table 4B, a new model was re-specified dropping the complexity measure. 
The results are provided in Table 5A and 5B. 
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Table 5A: TSCS Estimation Results for 20 Centers:
     Aggregate Features of Respecified Model
                          
          
Dependent Variable: UnitAVC (Counts: Measured 
by Number of Flights)
Model Description 
Estimation Method     
Number of Cross Sections                
Time Series Length                          
Fuller
    20 
       3 
Fit Statistics 
SSE              70.2005  
MSE  1.3245  
R-Square       0.6570 
  DFE                  
Root MSE  
   53 
1.1509
Variance Component Estimates 
Variance Component for Cross Sections   
Variance Component for Time Series           
Variance Component for Error                     
  13.02866  
 1.068327  
   1.090801
Hausman Test for Random Effects
DF  m Value  Pr > m
6           248.82         < 0.0001  
Interestingly, exclusion of complexity measures has increased the relevance of the choice of RE 
specification and the EGLS estimation.  Estimated parameters of the re-specified model (Table 5B) 
behave the same way as the generalized model (Table 4B). 
Table 5B: Re-Specified TSCS Estimation Results for 20 Centers: Parameters
The TSCSREG Procedure
Fuller and Battese Method Estimation
Dependent Variable: UnitAVC (Counts: Measured by Number of Flights)
Parameter Estimates
Standard  t-
Variable DF Estimate Error value  Pr > |t|  Label
Intercept  1 77.22322 9.628 8.02 <.0001 Intercept
w 1 0.000076 5.6E-05 1.35 0.1828 Average Annual Wage ($) of Center Controllers (PC&B)
Qi 1 -0.00004 9.65E-06 -3.9 0.0003 Number of Commercial Flights
Scale: Qi 1 3.90E-13 2.94E-12 0.13 0.8949 Scale Effect in Commercial Operations
Qj 1 -9.55E-06 2.8E-05 -0.3 0.7324 Number of IFR GA Flights
Scale:Qj 1 -9.15E-11 6.34E-11 -1.4 0.1549 Scale Effect in IFR GA Operations
Scope 1 4.88E-11 2.50E-11 1.95 0.0559 Scope Measure as captured by 
Interactions between Commercial and IFR GA Flights
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Often it is instructive to compare estimated model results to the actual data. Figure 7 shows the 
fit of the re-specified model to the data. 
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Figure 7: Deviations of Estimate from Actual Unit Variable Cost by Centers Over Time
The deviation measured by estimated results divided by actual data as percentage (vertical axis) 
over three fiscal years clearly demonstrates that the estimates, generally speaking, underestimated 
the actual data. Overall, these deviations are calculated to be -6.6% for FY03, -11% for FY04, and 
-12% for FY05, on average. Estimates underestimated almost half the sample by over 10%.38 
 In the specification above, aircraft flight operation counts was categorized as the measures 
of center’s output and services. It is argued elsewhere (Bhadra, Hogan and Schaufele 2006) that 
centers are better characterized by the amount of time that each aircraft spends within the center 
boundaries. Aircraft flight operation hours have been shown to be derived from aircraft that fly 
within the center’s geographical space. This measure therefore captures the essence of the flights: 
both the aircraft operation counts (i.e., occurrence) and the intensity of its use (i.e., hours). 
Considering the aircraft flight operation hours as the output metric as opposed to counts, unit 
variable cost was re-specified and equation (3) re-estimated. Results are shown in Tables 6A and 
6B. 
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Table 6A: TSCS Estimation Results for 20 Centers:
     Aggregate Features
                          
          
Dependent Variable: UnitAVC (Hours: Measured 
by Hours of Flight)
Model Description 
Estimation Method     
Number of Cross Sections                
Time Series Length                          
Fuller
    20 
       3 
Fit Statistics 
SSE              247.4333  
MSE  4.6686  
R-Square       0.7782  
  DFE                  
Root MSE  
   53 
2.1607
Variance Component Estimates 
Variance Component for Cross Sections   
Variance Component for Time Series           
Variance Component for Error                     
  50.78549  
 5.806803  
   3.667545
Hausman Test for Random Effects
DF  m Value  Pr > m
6           18.56          0.0023  
Looking at the aggregate features of the model, it is apparent that unit variable cost when 
measured and estimated in terms of aircraft flight operation hours improves statistical properties. 
This is supported by examining the estimated parameters in Table 6B. 
Table 6B: TSCS Estimation Results for 20 Centers: Parameters
The TSCSREG Procedure
Fuller and Battese Method Estimation
Dependent Variable: UnitAVC (Hours: Measured by Hours of Flight)
Parameter Estimates
Standard  t-
Variable DF Estimate Error value  Pr > |t|  Label
Intercept  1 79.47658 21.7998 3.65 <.0006 Intercept
w 1 0.000199 0.0001 1.9 0.0626 Average Annual Wage ($) of Center Controllers (PC&B)
Qi 1 -0.00007 3.10E-05 -2.37 0.0216 Number of Commercial Flights
Scale: Qi 1 2.06E-12 1.87E-11 0.11 0.9125 Scale Effect in Commercial Operations
Qj 1 1.22E-04 7.7E-05 1.59 0.1172 Number of IFR GA Flights
Scale:Qj 1 -4.07E-10 1.92E-10 -2.11 0.0393 Scale Effect in IFR GA Operations
Scope 1 9.81E-11 9.08E-11 1.08 0.2847 Scope Measure as captured by 
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Unlike the estimation reported in Table 5B, average wage appears to be statistically significant 
at 90% level. Unlike the earlier estimation, however, IFR GA hours tend to increase unit variable 
cost but its enhanced scale effects tends to reduce it. While the former is somewhat insignificant, the 
latter is statistically significant. The measure for scope economies, as captured by the interactions of 
the two users’ hours, has a positive sign (and thus still signifying diseconomies), but it is statistically 
insignificant. 
Using these estimated coefficients, the estimated results against the data is compared and 
reported in Figure 8. 
Figure 8:  Deviations of Estimate from Actual Unit Variable Cost (by hours) by Centers 
    Over Time
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 The specified model (as reported in Table 6B) matches the actual unit variable cost fairly well, 
with half the sample having less than 10% error. However, estimated unit variable cost, on average, 
overestimates actual unit variable cost – a finding that is in sharp contrast with the result when unit 
variable cost is estimated by aircraft flight operation counts (Figure 7). On average, errors are 6% for 
FY03, 3% for FY04, and 4% for FY05. Miami, Memphis, Salt Lake City, Jacksonville, Los Angeles 
(all positive), and Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta (all negative) have the largest errors between 
estimated results and actual data. 
An empirical analysis using a relatively small sample, founded on sound economic theories, 
shows some promise for examining policies influencing performance, cost and restructuring. As 
evident, the U.S. ATO’s en route centers that serve multiple users (i.e., commercial air carriers and 
IFR GA) may have considerable economic opportunities in terms of declining average total cost 
for ranges of services for some users. In particular, statistical results indicate that commercial air 
carriers enjoy increasing scale economies thus requiring special service attention.  Specialization in 
services requiring alignment of service provisions according to scale, and not scope, may have some 
empirical validity. Basic economic framework also indicates that pricing under natural monopoly 
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may require average cost pricing in absence of any external funding support. General government 
funding may be required in case of regulation that supports marginal cost pricing. Using the above 
econometric framework and data, prices (i.e., average and marginal cost) and magnitude of those 
external general funding can be calculated relatively easily. Furthermore, the above framework can 
be used for estimating center budgets using forecasted operations (i.e., commercial and IFR GA) as 
the basic drivers, keeping in mind the limitations of the model and underlying data. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this paper, an empirical framework using sound economic theories was developed. Using this 
framework, it was found that the ATO’s service provisions in the en route centers indeed enjoy 
some economies of scale. Furthermore, it was found that while controllers’ wage is important, it is 
not statistically significant in unit cost measured in aircraft flight operation counts. However, it is 
statistically significant when unit variable cost is measured and estimated in terms of aircraft flight 
operation hours. This result should be interpreted carefully for controllers’ wage is often dependent 
upon the centers’ traffic levels and complexity. The study also found that degree of complexity, 
a measure of service attributes, does not impact cost. This may very well be the artifact of the 
complexity variable in the analysis as captured by the IDAT. These findings combined with earlier 
discussion on pricing imply that ATO may be well positioned to implement average cost pricing if 
cost is to be fully recovered for en route services. The implementation of marginal cost pricing may 
require exogenous funding, perhaps from general funds of the U.S. Treasury. 
The paper can be improved in numerous ways. First, the sample size should be expanded 
to include other years (or quarterly data) with careful attention on issues relating to cost data 
comparability and subsequent errors. This will allow one to experiment with expanded empirical 
specifications. For example, while many more variables can be tried, experiments on the specification, 
from present linear to non-linear that are more accommodative, may also be tried. Second, the 
empirical specification is presently short on input variables. Consideration of other expenses, as 
a proxy measure of non-labor inputs, may also be tried including estimating long-term unit costs. 
Third, the framework can be improved by incorporating spatial-econometrics since activities and 
cost at en route centers is often contiguous and thus spatially dependent. Adjacent centers may 
exhibit costs that may not be aggregated. Fourth, a very brief comparison against the European 
ANSPs has been made in the paper. This analysis can be further expanded to include data from other 
ATSPs more rigorously. 
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Appendix A: FAA’s En Route Centers in the Contiguous U.S.
Key to Center IDs: 
ZAB Albuquerque ZLA Los Angeles
ZAU Chicago ZLC Salt Lake City
ZBW Boston ZMA Miami
ZDC Washington ZME Memphis
ZDV Denver ZMP Minneapolis
ZFW Fort Worth ZNY New York
ZHU Houston ZOA Oakland
ZID Indianapolis ZOB Cleveland
ZJX Jacksonville ZSE Seattle
ZKC Kansas City ZTL Atlanta
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Endnotes
1. Paper presented at the 7th ATIO/AIOO conference in Belfast, September, 2007. Authors would 
like to thank those who participated in the session and for their comments and suggestions. 
2. For a summary of these issues including FAA’s options, legislative processes, and timeframe, 
see http://www faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/trust_fund/media/Trust_Fund.pdf; retrieved August 
9, 2007.
3. See http://www faa.gov/regulations_policies/reauthorization; retrieved July 10, 2007. 
4. See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd? bill=s110-1300; introduced May 3, 2007 
and retrieved July 10, 2007. 
5. See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill =h110-2881; introduced June 27, 2007; 
retrieved July 10, 2007. 
6. For more details, see http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing
=582&comm=6; retrieved August 3, 2007. 
7. See Smart Skies Initiatives: www.smartskies.org
8. For a discussion of these issues see http://web nbaa.org/public/govt/issues/. 
9. A recent GAO report (2006) sums up this point most succinctly: “Representatives of GA, on the 
other hand, state that the system exists at its present size to serve the needs of the commercial 
aviation industry and that GA should be assigned only the incremental costs of serving GA, 
i.e., those costs that would not otherwise exist.” (p. 19 of the GAO Report #06-973: Aviation 
Finance: Observations on Potential FAA Funding Options”, September 2006). 
10. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that with the significant expansion of technologies, 
many of the industries once thought to be natural monopolies, are proving to have very few 
“natural” barriers. Telecommunications, utilities, and railroads are all examples in the United 
States. However, it is unlikely that the U.S. air transport service provisions will experience 
deregulations promoting similar competition in the short run.            
11. For example, Giovanni Bisignani, the Director General and CEO of the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), has noted recently “Airlines achieved amazing results in the 
last four years. Non-fuel unit costs decreased by 13%, Labour unit costs decreased by 33%, 
and distribution costs were slashed by 10%. Airlines will absorb US$21 billion in additional 
fuel costs without an erosion of profitability.” He congratulated the ATSPs for handling the 
productivity and efficiency issues effectively but noted that still much work needs to be done to 
improve efficiency in cost. Noting some interests towards privatization of the ATSPs, especially 
in Europe, Bisignani cautioned: “Privatization must be focused on efficiency—not making a 
quick buck for government coffers….Privatization needs a strong regulatory framework. The 
goal must be to constantly improve efficiency, drive down costs—and maintain safe operations. 
That is exactly what the airlines have done. And our partners must achieve the same,” [speech 
delivered at the “Partnership for Change with Air Navigation Service Providers - Cost Efficiency, 
Environment and Liberalisation:” http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2006-08-18-01 at the Gold 
Coast, Australia, retrieved on November 24, 2006. 
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12. See http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/; retrieved August 8, 2007. 
13. See http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/public/standard_page/doc_ace_reports.html;retrieved August 
8, 2007.  
14. For more information, see http://www.ato faa.gov/.
15. GAO (2006) sums up the role of Cost Accounting System (CAS) data in this debate as following: 
“...assessing the extent to which the current approach (i.e., excise tax based trust fund revenue 
collection) or any other approach (six proposed approaches) aligns costs with revenues would 
require completing an analysis of costs, using either a cost accounting system or cost finding 
techniques to distribute costs to the various NAS users..(p. 11)....”our point is that this capability 
(i.e., cost assignment or estimation) would be needed to operate under a cost-based user charge 
system”. (p 40).
16. See http://atofinance faa.gov/.
17. Note that the traffic data are measured in terms of the aircraft crossing the boundaries of centers. 
Thus, a long-haul flight is typically expected to cross more than one center, and hence, will be 
counted by multiple centers as an operation.  
18. See Appendix A for the en route center boundaries together with their names. 
19. Shades of colors arbitrarily represent different volumes of operations throughout the paper. 
20. It should be noted that we make these rankings using domestic traffic only. Thus, international, 
over flying, and oceanic traffic are not accounted for here. 
21. The term derived demand is used in the input-output context. That is, demand for operation 
hours are derived through its functional relationship with operation counts.  
22. The composition of flights may loosely represent altitudinal characteristics, another dimension 
in determination of workload.  
23. See www.atofinance.gov for basic performance metrics that the ATO tracks for centers. 
24. Throughout this analysis, we consider only variable cost and not total cost. Variable costs are 
defined as operations and maintenance costs and do not take into account fixed costs. 
25. Technical efficiency ensures that the representative firm operates at the lowest point of the 
average total cost while allocative efficiency is ensured when price is equal to marginal cost. 
26. Economies of scale and scope are, generally speaking, long-term concepts. However, data 
requirements are often numerous for constructing such long-term empirical functions. In order 
to avoid these, we keep our empirical framework short-run with an explicit acknowledgement 
that this framework should be ideally estimated for long-term data. 
27. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264, 104th Congress.
28. Last accessed June 29, 2006: http://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/costarchive /
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29. For more details, see http://www.apo.data faa.gov/faaETMSCall.htm.
30. Please note that accessing these data may require special permission from the FAA. 
31. To understand the empirical nature of the relationships, numerous other specifications and other 
variables were tried as well. Those specifications, results, and the entire dataset are available 
from the authors, upon request.
32. Due to the space limitations, we do not report these results in this paper. These and all other 
results reported in the paper are available from the authors upon request.
33. Generally speaking, when multicollinearity exists, affected estimates tend to have high standard 
errors and are usually unstable.
34. Condition indices can be generated via regression procedure (i.e., Proc Reg) in SAS. This is 
performed as follows: first, the X’X matrix (i.e., matrix containing explanatory variables) is 
scaled to have 1s as the diagonal elements. Following this transformation, the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors are calculated. The condition indices are the square roots of the ratio of the largest 
eigenvalue to each individual eigenvalue. The largest condition index is the condition number 
of the scaled X matrix and when this number is around 10, weak dependencies may begin to 
impact the regression parameters. When the index is larger than 100, a considerable number of 
numerical errors may exist. (see SAS (9.1).
35. In addition to fixed and random effect models (both one and two ways), Parks method can be 
used while specifying an autoregressive model and the Da Silva method can be used for mixed 
variance component moving-average model for testing and understanding specifications. 
36. Notice, however, the conventional R2 is inappropriate for all models that the TSCS procedure 
estimates using GLS. Hence, a generalization of the R-squared measure is reported in Table 4A. 
This is called Buse R2 method.  This number is interpreted as a measure of the proportion of 
the transformed sum of squares of the dependent variable that is attributable to the influence of 
the independent variables. In the case of OLS estimation, the Buse R2 is the same as the usual 
R2.
37. That is, covariance of an efficient GLS estimator with its difference from an inefficient OLS 
estimator is not zero. 
38. Given these apparent systematic results (i.e., greater underestimating over time), we formulate 
the deviation scores as function of time in order to evaluate the effect of time. We did not find 
any statistically useful results from this exercise.   
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